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REQUIRING CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS TO PROVE 
BLUE SKY EXEMPTIONS: A QUESTION OF DUE 
PROCESS 
The Uniform Securities Act, which has been adopted in nearly 
every state, places the burden o.f proving an exemption from its 
blue sky registration provisions on the person claiming the ex-
emption. Although some courts have interpreted this to mean 
the defendant has only the burden o.f raising the issue of exemp-
tion, most courts have placed the entire burden of persuasion on 
the defendant. This comment examines both rules to determine 
whether they are constitutional in light o.f the Supreme Court 
decisions on sh!fting burdens. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Section 402 of the Uniform Securities Act (Uniform Act) exempts 
from its registration provisions certain types of securities and securities 
transactions. l Prior to the approval of the Uniform Act by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (National 
ConferenceV the question of which party should bear the burden of 
proving exemption from blue sky registration provisions in criminal 
prosecutions had been raised by defendants and decided by the courts 
on numerous occasions. The law was clear that the burden of proof fell 
on the one who claimed the exemption. The drafters of the Uniform 
Act simply codified the decisional law in section 402(d).3 
Criminal defendants charged with a registration violation have 
claimed that the absence of an exemption is an element of the offense 
to be proven by the state, and that section 402( d) unconstitutionally 
shifts upon them the burden of proving that element. Most courts have 
not squarely addressed the claim, and instead have relied on the mere 
presence of section 402(d) to justify allocating the entire burden of 
proof to defendants. 
Some time after the adoption of the Uniform Act, and for reasons 
unrelated to it, a few courts began to lessen or alter the burden that the 
courts had consistently placed on criminal defendants. Rather than in-
terpreting section 402( d) literally and placing the entire burden of prov-
ing an exemption on the defendant, these courts have required only 
that the defendant satisfy the burden of production by raising the claim 
1. The purpose of exemptions from securities registration is best described in the 
legislative history to the Securities Act of 1933 where Representative Sam Ray-
burn of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, speaking on behalf 
of the House of Representatives, reported that "[i)t [H.R. 5480) carefully exempts 
from its application certain types of securities and securities transactions where 
there is no practical need for its application or where the public benefits are too 
remote." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933). 
2. The Uniform Act was originally approved by the National Conference on August 
25, 1956, and was later amended in 1958. See UNIF. SEC. ACT, 7A U.L.A. 562 
(1978). 
3. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(d), 7A U.L.A. 645 commissioners' note (1978). 
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of exemption at an appropriate time. Under this view, the ultimate 
burden of persuasion remained on the state, requiring it to prove the 
absence of an exemption once the issue was properly raised. These 
courts, however, have remained in the minority. 
Because due process constraints on shifting burdens and presump-
tions have been revolutionized over the past fifteen years, the time has 
come to evaluate the constitutionality of section 402(d) of the Uniform 
Act. This comment analyzes that provision in light of recent Supreme 
Court decisions to determine whether it meets the requirements of due 
process. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Evolution and Development of Section 402(d) of the Uniform 
Act 
1. Pre-Uniform Act 
From the beginning of blue sky regulation, courts overwhelmingly 
agreed that the burden of proving an exemption in a criminal case 
should fall on the one who claimed the benefit of the exemption.4 
When defendants challenged their convictions on the ground that the 
state should have been required to prove as an element of the offense 
that the transactions or securities were not exempt, the early courts 
were content either to rely on the presence of a statute similar to section 
402(d) as authority for placing the burden on the defendant,S or to find 
other justifications for requiring defendants to prove their entitlement 
to an exemption.6 
The pre-Uniform Act courts that had a statute on which to rely 
usually quoted the provision that placed the burden on the defendant, 
and then, sometimes expressly, deferred to the legislature.7 The courts 
4. People v. Murphy, 17 Cal. App. 2d 575, 587, 62 P.2d 592, 598 (1936); People v. 
Dean, 131 Cal. App. 228, 231, 21 P.2d 126, 128 (1933); People v. Wilson, 375 Ill. 
506,513-14,31 N.E.2d 959,962 (1941); People v. Smith, 315 Ill. App. 100, 104,42 
N.E.2d 119, 121 (1942); State v. Voorhies, 169 La. 626, 639, 125 So. 737, 742 
(1929); Robbins v. State, 144 Neb. 43, 44-45, 12 N.W.2d 152, 153 (1943); Com-
monwealth v. Harrison, 137 Pa. Super. 279, 283, 8 A.2d 733, 735 (1939); Com-
monwealth v. Freed, 106 Pa. Super. 529, 542, 162 A. 679, 685 (1932); Kreutzer v. 
Westfahl, 187 Wis. 463, 478-79, 204 N.W. 595,601 (1925). 
5. E.g., People v. Wilson, 375 Ill. 506, 513, 31 N.E.2d 959,962 (1941); Robbins v. 
State, 144 Neb. 43, 45, 12 N.W.2d 152, 153 (1943); Kreutzer v. Westfahl, 187 Wis. 
463,478, 204 N.W. 595, 601 (1925). 
6. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 89 Pa. Super. 439 (1926) (accepting trial court's 
placement of the burden, without explanation); see also infra notes 8-11 and ac-
companying text (discussing other justifications); if. State v. Voorhies, 169 La. 
626, 639, 125 So. 737, 742 (1929) (without proof that the securities sold did not 
belong to the prohibited class, the court would not assume that they were within 
the exempted class). 
7. See cases cited supra note 5. A prime example is Kreutzer v. Westfahl, 187 Wis. 
463, 204 N.W. 595 (1925), where the Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated: "We 
have no doubt as to the authority of the legislature to place upon defendants, 
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that did not have an express statutory provision upon which to rely 
either analogized to similar cases under other regulatory schemes,8 re-
lied upon precedent,9 or simply reasoned that the burden was properly 
placed on the defendant.lO Of all the cases during this pre-Uniform 
Act period, only one directly analyzed the contention that non-exemp-
tion constituted part of the offense and thus should be proven by the 
prosecution. II In a straightforward manner, this court held that exemp-
tions were not "affirmative matters necessary to constitute the crime 
[but were] matters of defense to a charge of unlawful sale of stock, 
which defenses may be made by the accused."12 
The pre-Uniform Act courts thus held unanimously that the bur-
den of proving an exemption should fall on the one who claims its ben-
efit, the defendant. None of these courts, however, analyzed or even 
identified a policy concern justifying this allocation of the burden of 
proof. Furthermore, none questioned whether requiring a defendant to 
prove an exemption violated the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. I3 
2. The Uniform Securities Act Section 402(d) 
The National Conference adopted the Uniform Act in 1956. 14 
Section 402(d) of the Uniform Act states: "In any proceeding under 
this act, the burden of proving an exemption or an exception from a 
defintion is upon the person claiming it."15 According to a note accom-
panying section 402( d), that section simply codified what had already 
been decided by the courtS. 16 The note does not list the individual de-
accused of offenses under this statute, the burden of proving that sales made by 
them come within the exemptions on which they rely." Id at 478, 204 N.W. at 
601. 
8. Commonwealth v. Freed, 106 Pa. Super. 529, 542, 162 A. 679, 685 (1932) (analo-
gizing a prosecution for selling securities without a license to other cases involving 
licenses before declaring that the burden should be on the defendant to show his 
authorization, e.g., a license, for doing the act, rather than on the state to prove 
that he had no license). 
9. Commonwealth v. Harrison, 137 Pa. Super. 279, 283, 8 A.2d 733, 735 (1939) (cit-
ing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 89 Pa. Super. 439, 445 (1926». 
10. People v. Dean, 131 Cal. App. 228, 231, 21 P.2d 126, 128 (1933) (one who sells 
securities has a duty to investigate whether he can do so lawfully, and based on 
this duty, should shoulder the burden of proving that his investigation was correct 
and that he was within the bounds of the law). 
11. People v. Murphy, 17 Cal. App. 2d 575, 585, 62 P.2d 592, 598 (1936). 
12. Id at 586, 62 P.2d at 598. Murphy dealt with "exceptions" rather than "exemp-
tions" that, as the note to section 402 indicates, differ only in their scope of protec-
tion. For purposes of this comment, however, the relevance of Murphy is not 
diminished in the least. 
13. U.S. CON ST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
14. See supra note 2. 
15. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(d), 7A U.L.A. 642 (1978). 
16. The note states: "This codifies existing law. See the cases cited in Loss, Securities 
Regulation, (1951 & 1955 Supp.), p. 414, n. 365." UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(d), 7A 
U.L.A. 645 commissioners' note (1978). 
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cisions codified in section 402( d), but cites a footnote in a treatise writ-
ten by the draftsman of the Uniform Act, Professor Louis LOSS.17 
In that footnote, Professor Loss cites several of the pre-Uniform 
Act cases discussed above. 18 He also includes several civil decisions 
instituted by third persons attempting to recover funds from sellers who 
failed to register either themselves as broker-dealers or the securities 
they sold, and were claiming to be exempt. 19 Also cited is SEC v. Ral-
ston Purina Co., 20 a United States Supreme Court decision that briefly 
discussed the propriety of requiring defendants to prove their exempt 
status.21 Because Ralston Purina arose out of an injunctive proceeding 
instituted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rather 
than a criminal prosecution, and because the Court was mainly con-
cerned with defining the scope of the private offering exemption under 
the Securities Act of 1933,22 the case is not dispositive of the constitu-
tional due process question of whether criminal defendants can be re-
quired to prove exemptions.23 The civil decisions24 cited by Professor 
Loss likewise do not dispose of the constitutional claim. 
The only apparent support for applying section 402(d) in a crimi-
nal prosecution is the pre-Uniform Act decisions that failed to discuss 
the constitutional question. Once codified, these decisions strongly in-
17. L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 414 n.365 (1951). 
18. Id (citing State v. Voorhies, 169 La. 626, 125 So. 737 (1929); Commonwealth v. 
Freed, 106 Pa. Super. 529, 162 A.2d 679 (1932); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 89 
Pa. Super. 439 (1926». 
19. Campbell v. Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975 (W.D. Pa. 1951); A.C. Frost & Co. v. 
Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 61 Idaho 21, 98 P.2d 965 (1939); Dobal v. Guardian 
Fin. Corp., 251 Ill. App. 220 (1929); Harvey v. Electric Refrigeration Corp., 246 
Mich. 235, 224 N.W. 443 (1929). 
20. 346 U.S. 119 (1953). 
21. The Court devoted one sentence of its opinion to the burden of proof issue: 
"Keeping in mind the broadly remedial purposes of federal securities legislation, 
imposition of the burden of proof on an issuer who would plead the exemption 
seems to us fair and reasonable." Id at 126. 
22. See 15 U.S.c. § 77d (1982). 
23. See Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934), where the Court unanimously 
invalidated a statutory scheme that required a defendant to prove American citi-
zenship or entitlement thereto in a prosecution for violating California's Alien 
Land Law. Justice Cardozo wrote: "What has been written applies only to those 
provisions of the statute that prescribe the rule for criminal causes. Other consid-
erations mayor may not apply where the controversy is civil. We leave that ques-
tion open." Id at 96-97; see also Note, Affirmative J)efenses and J)ue Process: The 
Constitutionality of Placing a Burden of Persuasion on a Criminal J)efendant, 64 
GEO. L.J. 871, 881-82 (1976), in which the commentator noted: 
The justification for placing the burden of persuasion on a civil defend-
ant does not apply in a criminal proceeding ... , [b]ecause society has 
no overriding need to promote the interests of either party in a civil ac-
tion, [and] the risk that a litigant will be unable to satisfy his burden of 
persuasion does not threaten any social interest. 
Id (footnotes omitted). 
24. See supra note 19. The language of section 402(d) was intended to apply "[i]n any 
proceeding under th[e] act," including civil actions. This explains why Professor 
Loss cited the civil cases. 
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fiuenced the current trend that continues to require criminal defendants 
to prove their entitlement to blue sky exemptions. 
3. Post-Uniform Act 
Most cases decided after the adoption of the Uniform Act continue 
to place the burden of proving an exemption from registration upon 
criminal defendants. As in the cases that arose before the adoption of 
the Uniform Act, the defendants contended that the absence of an ex-
emption was an element of the offense of selling unregistered securities 
or failing to register as a broker-dealer and should have been proven by 
the state. Most post-Uniform Act courts dismissed this claim on 
grounds identical to those relied upon by their predecessors, relying 
upon pre-Uniform Act cases as precedent.25 Those courts in states that 
had adopted the Uniform Act based their decisions on statutory 
equivalents to section 402(d) as well as on precedent.26 A few post-
25. State v. Goodman, 110 Ariz. 524, 526-27, 521 P.2d 611, 613 (1974); State v. 
Hoephner, 574 P.2d 1079, 1081 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978) (dictum); Sisson v. State, 
404 P.2d 55, 58-59 (Okla. Crim. App. 1964) (per curiam); Nelson v. State, 355 P.2d 
413, 419-20 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960); Commonwealth v. Bomersbach, 260 Pa. 
Super. 28, 33, 383 A.2d 995, 998 (1978). 
26. See United States ex rel Shott v. Tehan, 365 F.2d 191, 194-95 (6th Cir. 1966) 
(construing Ohio law), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1012 (1967); State v. Barber, 133 
Ariz. 572, 578, 653 P.2d 29, 35 (1982); State v. Baumann, 125 Ariz. 404, 412, 610 
P.2d38, 46 (1980); People V. Skelton, 109 Cal. App. 3d 691, 724, 167 Cal. Rptr. 
636,654 (1980); People v. Park, 87 Cal. App. 3d 550,556-67, 151 Cal. Rptr. 146, 
154-55 (1978); State v. Buchman, 361 So. 2d 692, 694-95 (Fla. 1978) (court quoted 
the statute, analyzed it to determine the elements of the offense, then, in a foot-
note, cited an old case standing for a rule of statutory construction); Worsley v. 
State, 162 Ind. App. 34, 37-38, 317 N.E.2d 908,910-11 (1974) (court quoted statute 
to support placing the burden on the defendant, then cited a civil decision as 
precedent). 
Forty-five states have adopted statutes with language similar to section 
402(d). ALA. CODE § 8-6-11(b) (1975 & Supp. 1983); ALASKA STAT. 
§ 45.55.140(c) (1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2033 (1967); ARK. STAT. ANN. 
§ 67-1248(d) (1980); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25163 (West 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 11-51-113(5) (Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-490(d) (West 1958); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7309(d) (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.171 (West Supp. 
1983); GA. CODE § 1O-5-22(a) (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 485-17 (1976); IDAHO 
CODE § 30-1456 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 137-15A (Smith-Hurd 
1960 & Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-16(j) (Burns 1984); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 502.205 (West 1949 & Supp. 1983-1984); !UN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1272 
(1981); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 292.420(1) (Baldwin 1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 51:712 (West 1965); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-604 (1975); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110A, § 402(d) (West 1958 and Supp. 1983-1984); MICH. 
COMPo LAWS ANN. § 451.802(c) (West Supp. 1983-1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 80A.15 subd. 4 (West Supp. 1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-71-207 (Supp. 1983); 
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.402(f) (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-106 
(1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1121 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 90.100 (1983); N.H. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 421-B:17 V. (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-50(d) (West 1970); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13-44(A) (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-18(b) (1981); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.45 (Page 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 401(e) 
(West 1965 & Supp. 1983-1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 59.275 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 70, § 1-204(c) (Purdon 1965 & Supp. 1983-1984); S.c. CODE ANN. § 35-1-340 
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Uniform Act decisions, however, recognized a possible due process 
problem and accordingly analyzed the "element of the offense" argu-
ment in light of the constitutional law related to presumptions and 
shifting burdens.27 All but one of these decisions expressly held that 
the burden of proving exemptions should rest on the defendant.28 
While most post-Uniform Act courts reaffirmed the view of the 
early courts, other courts redefined and reduced the nature of the de-
fendant's burden by holding that he need only satisfy the burden of 
production and not the entire burden of proving an exemption.29 
Under this minority view, the state was then required to disprove any 
claimed exemption.30 What little federal law exists in this area appears 
to adopt the minority view.3l 
The rationales behind the decisions that adopt the minority view 
(Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-31-98 (1983); TEX. REV. CIV. 
STAT. ANN. arts. 581-587 (Vernon 1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-14.5 (Supp. 
1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4222 (1970); VA. CODE § 13.1-514(d) (1978 & Supp. 
1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 21.20.540 (1978); W. VA. CODE § 32-4-402(d) 
(1982); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 551.24(5) (West Supp. 1983); WYo. STAT. § 17-4-
114(d) (1977). 
27. United States ex rei Shott v. Tehan, 365 F.2d 191, 195 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. de-
nied, 385 U.S. 1012 (1967); State v. Goetz, 312 N.W.2d 1,9-10 (N.D. 1981); State 
v. Frost, 57 Ohio St. 2d 121, 125-28, 387 N.E.2d 235, 238-39 (1979); State v. 
Fairchild, 298 S.E.2d 110, 121-22 (W. Va. 1982); see infra text accompanying 
notes 84-90 (discussing Frost and Goetz). 
28. The only court that did not expressly sanction the placement of the burden on the 
defendant was the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in State v. 
Fairchild, 298 S.E.2d 110 (W. Va. 1982). Rather than reject the defendant's con-
tention that the state should be required to prove exemptions, the Fairchild court 
assumed arguendo that the contention was correct since the state had sufficiently 
proved the absence of any exemption. Thus, the court found it unnecessary to 
decide the constitutionality of requiring defendants to prove exemption. Id at 
122. 
29. Commonwealth v. David, 365 Mass. 47, 54-56, 309 N.E.2d 484, 488-90 (1974); 
People v. Dempster, 396 Mich. 700, 711-14, 242 N.W.2d 381, 387-88 (1976); Cox 
v. State, 523 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Dean v. State, 433 S.W.2d 
173, 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968). The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas im-
pliedly overruled Dean and Cox in Koah v. State, 604 S.W.2d 156, 163 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1980), and adopted the majority view that places the entire burden of 
proving exemption upon the defendant. 
30. This minority view was defined by the Supreme Court of Michigan in People v. 
Dempster, 396 Mich. 700, 242 N.W.2d 381 (1976), where it stated: 
[O)nce the state establishes a prima facie case of statutory violation, 
the burden of going forward, i.e., of injecting some competent evidence 
of the exempt status of the securities, shifts to the defendant. However, 
once the defendant properly injects the issue, the State is obliged to es-
tablish the contrary beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Id at 714,242 N.W.2d at 388 (citations omitted). 
31. The federal view on proving blue sky exemptions is difficult to determine because 
of the paucity of decisions discussing the issue. See United States v. Dinneen, 463 
F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1972), however, where the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit stated: "Next, [the defendant] argues that the Government 
failed to prove that the [issued) stock was not within the exemptions from the 
requirements of § 5 of the Act. It was incumbent on the defendant, not the Gov-
ernment, to set up an exception and present proof raising such a defense." Id at 
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are varied. One court offered no reason for limiting the defendant's 
burden.32 Other courts analogized the exemption from blue sky regis-
tration to other affirmative criminal defenses, such as insanity, which 
the state was not required to disprove unless raised.33 The most note-
worthy case in this line of minority decisions is People v. Dempster, 34 a 
1976 Supreme Court of Michigan decision. The Dempster court likened 
the sale of unregistered securities to carrying a handgun without a per-
mit. Both offenses were governed by statutes containing similar lan-
guage that placed the burden of proving excuse or exemption upon the 
defendant.35 The court had previously construed the handgun statute 
to require the defendant merely to introduce the issue of license or ex-
emption by offering some evidence thereof, thus obligating the state to 
prove the contrary beyond a reasonable doubt.36 In Deml/ster, the 
court gave a similar construction to the blue sky provision.3 
In sum, most post-Uniform Act courts deferred to the legislature 
and relied on the presence of a statute to reject the contention that the 
absence of an exemption should be proven by the state as an element of 
the offense. A few of the courts that relied upon section 402( d) recog-
nized a potential due process problem, but found the statutory alloca-
tion of the burden acceptable. A minority of the post-Uniform Act 
courts, however, modified the burden imposed by section 402(d), re-
quiring only that a defendant assert his entitlement to an exemption 
without having to prove that he was in fact exempt. These majority 
and minority approaches remain in conflict today. 
B. Development of the Present Due Process ReqUirements 
Before analyzing whether section 402( d) is constitutional under the 
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,38 it is necessary to 
define the requirements of due process. The test to be applied in ana-
lyzing whether defendants can be required to prove certain facts or cir-
cumstances to avoid conviction has developed through several 
Supreme Court decisions over a period of nearly half a century. 
The first major Supreme Court decision to analyze whether the 
burden of proving certain facts could constitutionally be shifted from 
1041-42. The cases cited in Dinneen are even less helpful in determining the fed-
eral stance. 
32. See Dean v. State, 433 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968). In Dean, the Court of 
Criminal Appeals of Texas stated: "The burden rested with appellant to raise this 
exemption defense; then, if raised, the burden shifted to the State to disprove such 
defense beyond a reasonable doubt." Id at 178, quoted in Cox v. State, 523 
S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). 
33. Commonwealth v. David, 365 Mass. 47, 54, 309 N.E.2d 484, 488-89 (1974). 
34. 396 Mich. 700, 242 N.W.2d 381 (1976). 
35. Id at 712, 242 N.W.2d at 387. 
36. See People v. Henderson, 391 Mich. 612, 218 N.W.2d 2 (1974). 
37. Dempster, 396 Mich. at 713, 242 N.W.2d at 388; see supra note 30. 
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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the prosecution to the defense was Morrison v. California. 39 In Morri-
son, the Court invalidated a California statute that made it a criminal 
offense for an alien to own land because the statute expressly required 
the defendant to prove his citizenship to exonerate himself.40 Although 
holding that the state should have been required to prove the lack of 
citizenship. the Court conceded that "within limits of reason and fair-
ness the burden of proof may be lifted from the state in criminal prose-
cutions and cast on a defendant."41 The court proceeded to define 
those "limits" and found that the statute had clearly exceeded them.42 
One commentator has attributed to Morrison what has become known 
as the "comparative convenience" test for determining the validity of 
affirmative defenses.43 This commentator and others acknowledge that 
later developments in the law have made this test an insufficient basis 
for shifting the entire burden of proof to a criminal defendant.44 
In Tot v. United States,45 the second major decision in this area, 
the Supreme Court defined the limits on the legislature's ability to shift 
the burden of proof onto criminal defendants. At issue in Tot was a 
statute that created a presumption that the defendant had to rebut to 
39. 291 U.S. 82 (1934). Morrison was not the first Supreme Court case to analyze the 
issue as indicated by the Court's partial reliance on McFarland v. American Sugar 
Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1916). Although McFarland recognized that the legislature 
cannot go beyond certain limits in shifting burdens of proof to a defendant, it did 
not discuss these limitations. 
40. Morrison, 291 U.S. at 96-97. 
41. Id at 88. 
42. Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court, stated: 
The limits are in substance these, that the state shall have proved 
enough to make it just for the defendant to be required to repel what has 
been proved with excuse or explanation, or at least that upon a balanc-
ing of convenience or of the opportunities for knowledge the shifting of 
the burden will be found to be an aid to the accuser without subjecting 
the accused to hardship or oppression. 
Id at 88-89. 
43. Osenbaugh, The Constitutionality of Affirmative Defenses to Criminal Charges, 29 
ARK. L. REv. 429, 436-37 (1976). 
The language from Morrison relied upon in formulating the comparative 
convenience test is as follows: "For a transfer of the burden [of proof] there must 
be in any event a manifest disparity in convenience of proof and opportunity for 
knowledge, as, for instance, where a general prohibition is applicable to everyone 
who is unable to bring himself within the range of an exception." Morrison, 291 
U.S. at 91 (citation omitted). The American Law Institute has also incorporated 
this language into its definition of an affirmative defense: "A ground of defense is 
affirmative, within the meaning of Subsection (2)(a) of this Section, when: . . . it 
involves a matter of excuse or justification peculiarly within the knowledge of the 
defendant on which he can fairly be required to adduce supporting evidence." 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
44. Osenbaugh, supra note 43, at 436-37, 455; Note, supra note 23, at 886. Later 
decisions have expressly held that mere convenience of proof or access to infor-
mation will not justify shifting the burden of persuasion onto a criminal defend-
ant. See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702 (1975); Tot v. United States, 
319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943). 
45.319 U.S. 463 (1943). 
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avoid conviction.46 The Tot Court invalidated the statute, holding that 
the state cannot prove some facts and then presume the ultimate facts 
necessary to establish guilt unless there is some rational relationship 
between the facts proved and those presumed.47 Otherwise the defend-
ant would have "the obligation of exculpation."48 
Perhaps the most influential decision in the area of shifting bur-
dens of proof was In re Winship,49 a 1970 Supreme Court decision. 
Although the primary issue in Winship was the definition of the appro-
priate standard of proof to be applied in juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings,50 the decision was invaluable in defining the requirements of due 
process. Speaking for the Court, Justice Brennan wrote: "[W]e explic-
itly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against con-
viction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt r every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged "5 This hold-
ing emphasized the important interests of the defendant that are at 
stake in a criminal prosecution, namely his liberty and his good 
name.52 The Court also considered the importance of reducing the risk 
of erroneous convictions, 53 as well as maintaining public trust and con-
fidence in the criminal justice system. 54 Winship's definition, while in-
valuable, has been subject to conflicting interpretations. Some view it 
as mandating an elemental apgroach in determining what a defendant 
may be called upon to prove. 5 Others though hail the Court's use of 
the terminology "every fact necessary to constitute the crime,"56 cou-
pled with the absence of the word "element," as the "seeds for aban-
donment of the formalistic elements approach."57 
46. The statute made it a crime for a twice-convicted felon to receive a firearm or 
ammunition that had been shipped in interstate commerce. Upon proof of posses-
sion of the firearm by this person, and that he had twice been convicted of a crime 
of violence, it was presumed that the firearm was shipped in interstate commerce. 
Id at 464. 
47. Id at 469. 
48. Id 
49. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
50. Id at 359. 
51. Id at 364 (emphasis supplied). 
52. Id at 363-64. 
53. Id at 363. 
54. Id at 364. 
55. See Note, Burden oj Proving Affirmative Ilifense Can Be Placed on Ilifendant, 29 
MERCER L. REV. 875, 877 (1978). 
The elemental approach represents more of a statutory development than a 
constitutional analysis. It is a formalistic approach that is used to distinguish ele-
ments of an offense from exceptions or exemptions strictly on the basis of whether 
the exception is included within the enacting clause of the statute. As a test for 
determining the constitutionality of a statutory scheme, this approach may be eas-
ily undermined by the state as the Court recognized in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 
U.S. 684,698-99 (1975). For a further discussion of the elemental approach, see 
Osenbaugh, supra note 43, at 437-41. For a blue sky decision applying the ele-
mental approach analysis, see State v. Buchman, 361 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1978). 
56. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364. 
57. Osenbaugh, supra note 43, at 442. 
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The full scope of Winship was not realized until the Supreme 
Court's 1975 decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur. 58 In Mullaney, the issue 
was whether the state could constitutionally punish all intentional kill-
ing as murder unless the defendant could disprove the presumption of 
malice by showing that the killing was the result of heat of passion on 
sudden provocation. 59 The prosecution contended that because ab-
sence of heat of passion, i.e., malice, was not a "fact necessary to consti-
tute the crime,"60 and was only related to the degree of punishment to 
be imposed, Winship was inapplicable.61 The Court rejected this con-
tention and extended the Winship due process requirement beyond the 
mere elements of the crime to all factors that affect the degree of culpa-
bility and the extent of punishment to be imposed.62 To limit Winship 
to the facts that constitute a crime, reasoned the Court, would en-
courage states to simply redefine different crimes to circumvent its 
holding.63 
In reaching its decision, the Mullaney Court emphasized the same 
interests of both society and the defendant that were the bases for the 
Winship holding. Among others, the Court emphasized society'S inter-
est in the reliability of jury verdicts, as well as the importance of reduc-
ing the risk of erroneous convictions.64 The Court rejected the state's 
justification for shifting the burden to the defendant, i.e., the difficulty 
in proving a negative.65 
One commentator has interpreted Mullaney as requiring a balanc-
ing of the interests involved in light of Winship to determine whether 
the fact at issue is "critical" and should thus be proven by the state.66 
Other commentators have either viewed the decision as a limited hold-
ing requiring state courts to reexamine affirmative defenses on a case-
by-case basis,67 or have criticized it for failing to enunciate a test for 
determining the substance of a crime.68 
In Patterson v. New York, 69 decided two years after Mullaney, the 
Supreme Court redefined the test for determining whether the burden 
of proving certain facts could be placed upon a criminal defendant. On 
facts almost indistinguishable from Mullaney, the Court affirmed a sec-
ond-degree murder conviction under a New York statute that required 
58. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). 
59. lei. at 691-92. 
60. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364. 
61. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 696-97. 
62. lei. at 697-98. 
63. lei. at 698-99. 
64. lei. at 699-701. 
65. lei. at 701-02. 
66. Osenbaugh, supra note 43, at 447. 
67. Note, Mullaney v. Wilbur, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 493, 509 (1976). 
68. Dutile, The Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: A Comment on The Mullaney-
Patterson Doctrine, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 380, 382 (1980) (criticizing both Mulla-
ney and Patterson for failing to provide guidelines); Note, supra note 55, at 879. 
69. 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
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a defendant to prove affirmatively that he was acting under the influ-
ence of extreme emotional distress so as to reduce the crime to man-
slaughter.70 By employing an elemental approach, something it had 
earlier eschewed as a means of undermining Winship, 71 the Court dis-
tinguished Mullaney, or at least limited it to its facts.72 The important 
interests that were relied upon in Winship and Mullaney were no longer 
considered paramount in Patterson. 
While recognizing the potential for legislative abuse, and even 
cautioning that it may sometimes be necessary to look beyond a statu-
tory definition of a crime to ensure that the legislature has neither acci-
dentally nor intentionally mislabeled an element of the offense, the 
Court made it clear that one cannot question the manner in which a 
state legislature chooses to define a criminal offense absent an obvious 
due process violation.73 Furthermore, the Court held that a state need 
not disprove affirmative defenses 74 nor must it prove the nonexistence 
of mitigating circumstances "if in its judgment this would be too cum-
bersome, too expensive, and too inaccurate.'>7S The rule derived from 
Patterson is essentially a restatement of Winship with some altered ter-
minology to indicate the adoption of the elemental approach.76 
Patterson may best be understood by viewing it in the broad con-
text of federalism.77 Like Mullaney, the decision has been criticized for 
its failure to formulate a workable test for distinguishing defenses from 
elements of the crime.78 Some believe that in its desire to limit the 
broad scope that Mullaney had given to Winship, the Patterson Court 
simply went further than it intended.79 
In summary, "[t]here is no black letter rule as to when it is proper 
to allocate the burden of proof to the accused."80 Patterson, though, 
70. Id at 216. 
71. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
72. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 215-16; see also Note, supra note 55, at 882 ("Patterson 
drained Winship of much of its vitality and virtually restricted Mullaney to a sin-
gle specific set of facts."). For a suggestion that Palferson rejected Mullaney, see 
Note, The Constitutionality of Affirmative Difenses After Patterson v. New York, 
78 COLUM. L. REV. 655, 665 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, After Patterson]; 
Note, Patterson v. New York, Criminal Procedure-The Burden of Proof and Af-
firmative Difenses, 9 U. ToL. L. REV. 524, 544 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, 
Patterson v. New York] ("Palferson provides the blueprint to sidestep the due 
process requirements of Winship and Mullaney. 7 
73. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210. 
74. Id 
75. Id at 209. 
76. The Court remarked: "[T]he Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of 
the offense of which the defendant is charged." Id at 210 (emphasis supplied); 
see supra text accompanying note 51. 
77. See Note, After Patterson, supra note 72, at 661; Note, Patterson v. New York, 
supra note 72, at 542; Note, supra note 55, at 881. 
78. See Note, Patterson v. New York, supra note 72, at 544. 
79. Note, After Patterson, supra note 72, at 678. 
80. Id at 655. 
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represents the most recent Supreme Court analysis on the constitution-
ality of affirmative defenses. In essence, the state is only required to 
prove the facts that constitute elements of the crime charged, i.e., those 
matters contained within the statutory provision. Although it may be 
necessary to question the manner in which a legislature has defined a 
particular offense, courts should do so only when it it obvious that the 
limits of due process have been exceeded. Otherwise, the legislature 
may constitutionally require a defendant to prove affirmatively facts 
not contained within the statutory definition of the offense, and the 
state need not prove the nonexistence of those facts. 
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
SECTION 402(d) 
A. An Overview 
Most state courts currently require defendants to prove exemption 
from a blue sky registration requirement. The following will trace the 
development of this requirement in the context of section 402( d). 
A majority of courts during the early period of blue sky regulation 
relied on untested statutes in placing the burden of proof on defend-
ants, or otherwise justified this placing of the burden.81 None of the 
early courts questioned the due process implications of placing the bur-
den on the accused rather than on the prosecution. These decisions 
were then codified in the Uniform Act,82 and after the adoption of the 
Uniform Act, many state courts deferred to their respective legislatures 
and accepted the placement of the burden upon the defendant. 83 Cur-
rent law, therefore, is founded upon a few old decisions that are of 
doubtful validity today. 
This conclusion does not amount to a criticism of the early courts 
for their failure to consider the due process issue, because the Supreme 
Court had not yet outlined the due process limitations on the shifting of 
burdens of production and proof. The post-Uniform Act decisions, 
however, were made in a different constitutional environment, and 
mere reliance on the language of section 402( d) or the early decisions is 
questionable in light of later Supreme Court holdings. Equally ques-
tionable are the recent decisions that recognized the due process issue, 
but simply relied upon Patterson v. New York 84 and failed to analyze 
the question in a coherent fashion. 
A decision that illustrates the failure to analyze a statute similar to 
section 402(d) in light of the present requirements of due process is 
State v. Frost, 85 decided in 1979 by the Supreme Court of Ohio. In 
81. See supra notes 5-6. 
82. See supra note 15. 
83. See supra note 26. 
84. 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
85. 57 Ohio St. 2d 121,387 N.E.2d 235 (1979). 
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Frost, before proceeding to outline the major Supreme Court decisions 
discussed above,86 the court seemingly assumed that exemptions were 
affirmative defenses. Relying upon Patterson, the court concluded that 
the state was not required to disprove these defenses.87 The court did 
not discuss the elements of the offense until the end of its opinion,88 
and did not provide any further analysis. 
A similar decision is State v. Goetz,89 a 1981 decision by the 
Supreme Court of North Dakota. As in Frost, the court provided an 
excellent overview of the developments of the due process require-
ments.90 After outlining the law, however, the court immediately con-
cluded that "the state did offer proof of every essential element of the 
offense."91 Although doing so would have proved fruitless, the court 
did not attempt to define the "essential elements" of the crime, thus 
leaving room to question how it reached its conclusion. The Goetz 
court did not engage in any further analysis. 
As these recent decisions illustrate, Patterson v. New York 92 does 
not provide a bright-line test for determining the constitutional limits 
of burden-shifting. The most persuasive explanation for this shortcom-
ing is that the Supreme Court wanted to emphasize the importance of 
leaving the administration of criminal law to the states,93 and did not 
want to question the manner in which state legislatures define various 
crimes and defenses. Simply because the Supreme Court chose not to 
question state legislative decisions involving the definition of criminal 
offenses absent an obvious due process contravention is not a valid rea-
son for state courts to adopt a similar position. Yet, as Goetz and Frost 
exemplify, some have done exactly that. Surely the Court did not in-
tend for courts to adopt this position because it would leave state legis-
latures virtually unchecked. 
A valid reason thus exists for questioning the manner in which 
courts have interpreted section 402(d) of the Uniform Act. A reasoned 
analysis is necessary to determine whether a defendant charged with 
violating a blue sky registration provision may constitutionally be re-
86.ld at 124-28,387 N.E.2d at 238-39; see supra notes 49-77. 
87. Frost, 57 Ohio St. 2d at 127, 387 N.E.2d at 239. 
88. The end of the opinion stated: 
It remains with the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the 
essential elements of the offense: (I) that the offense was committed in 
the county; (2) that the defendant was selling securities without having 
been licensed as a security dealer; and (3) that the defendant was selling 
unlicensed securities. 
Id at 128, 387 N.E.2d at 239. What the court characterized as one offense is 
actually two separate offenses. A person can be charged with selling securities 
without being licensed to do so, or simply selling unlicensed securities, or both as 
was Frost. 
89.312 N.W.2d I (N.D. 1981). 
90. Id at 9-10. 
91. Id at 10. 
92.432 U.S 197 (1977). 
93. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
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qui red to prove exemption from the Uniform Act. The following pro-
vides a suggested approach for resolving this issue. 
B. A Suggested Analysis 
1. The Elements of the Offense 
As discussed above,94 there are obvious infirmities in relying upon 
the elemental approach for determining whether an unconstitutional 
burden has been placed upon a defendant. The Supreme Court has 
recognized the ease with which this analysis can be undermined.95 De-
spite its shortcomings, however, the elemental approach is a valuable 
touchstone in analyzing the constitutionality of section 402( d). In using 
this approach to analyze an offense, attention is focused upon the statu-
tory definition of the offense to determine whether all of the essential 
elements are characterized as such and have not been either labeled 
affirmative defenses or disregarded totally. The logical starting point, 
therefore, is to see how the legislature has defined the particular 
offense. 
Only two courts have expressly enumerated the elements of a blue 
sky registration violation.96 Both decisions involved dual violations, 
i.e., the defendant failed to both register himself as a broker-dealer in 
securities and to register the securities in which he dealt.97 This discus-
sion though concerns only prosecutions for failing to register the securi-
ties that were issued. As listed by these courts, the offense of selling 
unregistered securities contains two elements: (1) that the offense oc-
curred within the geographical jurisdiction of the court; and (2) that the 
securities sold were not registered.98 Since the offense is statutory and 
is derived from the Uniform Act, other courts would presumably con-
cur in this listing of the elements. 
The above listing places no burden on the state to prove that the 
securities sold had to be registered, only that they were not registered. 
Interestingly, early blue sky regulation provided that the state was re-
quired to prove the additional element that the securities were of a class 
that had to be registered.99 This requirement has inexplicably vanished 
94. See supra note 55. 
95. See supra notes 63 and 72 and accompanying text. 
96. United States ex rel Shott v. Tehan, 365 F.2d 191, 196 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. de-
nied, 385 U.S. 1012 (1967); State v. Frost, 57 Ohio St. 2d 121, 127-28,387 N.E.2d 
235, 239 (1979). Fros/ is discussed at supra text accompanying notes 85-87. 
97. See supra note 87. 
98. United States ex rel Shott v. Tehan, 365 F.2d 191, 196 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. de-
nied, 385 U.S. 1012 (1967); State v. Frost, 57 Ohio St. 2d 121, 127-28,387 N.E.2d 
235, 239 (1979). 
99. See People v. Johnson, 355 Ill. 380, 388, 189 N.E. 271, 275 (1934) ("evidence must 
be produced by the people showing in what classes the securities belong in a pros-
ecution under the act"), relied upon in People v. Baldwin, 289 Ill. App. 126, 134,6 
N.E.2d 904, 908 (1937) ("the burden is upon the people to prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that the securities sold were Class D securities [i.e., ones that had to be 
registered]"). In People v. Wilson, 375 Ill. 506, 512, 31 N.E.2d 959, 961 (1941), 
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from the definition of the offense. If the state is only required to prove 
that the securities involved were unregistered, it is simply begging the 
question of whether they had to be registered before they could be of-
fered and lawfully sold. What has occurred with the offense of selling 
unregistered securities may be an example of what the Supreme Court 
feared in Mullaney, 100 and what some believe Patterson 101 legitimized 
- the redefinition of an offense to ease the state's burden by transform-
ing an element of the crime into an affirmative defense, thus requiring 
an accused to prove his innocence. 
The only explanation for the absence of the third element of the 
offense is that it has been converted into a presumption to lessen the 
state's burden. Under this allocation, the state need only prove that the 
defendant issued unregistered securities within the jurisdiction of the 
court, and the law presumes that the securities were subject to registra-
tion, that is, were not exempt. It is then incumbent upon the defendant 
to rebut the presumption and affirmatively prove that he was not re-
quired to register the securities before selling them. 
The constitutionality of shifting the burden in this fashion neces-
sarily rests on the validity of the presumption employed. 102 The next 
step in the analysis, therefore, is to test the presumption. 
2. The Validity of Presuming the Necessity of Registration 
There are several ways to test the validity of a presumption, one of 
which is to apply the rational connection test. 103 Under this test, a pre-
sumption is only valid if the facts presumed bear some rational connec-
tion to the facts proved. In this case, the fact presumed is that the 
securities issued were required to be registered. The issue is whether 
this rationally follows from proof that unregistered securities were sold. 
Although a rational connection between the two is not readily appar-
ent, this does not necessarily invalidate the presumption. 
Since presumptions and affirmative defenses are closely related,I04 
another method for determining the validity of the presumption is to 
apply the comparative convenience test. 105 This test is usually applied 
decided four years after Baldwin, the Supreme Court of Illinois clarified its earlier 
decision by holding that the state need not prove that the sale of the unregistered 
securities took place under circumstances that would make it exempt. This hold-
ing was reaffirmed by the Appellate Court of Illinois in People v. Smith, 315 Ill. 
App. 100, 104,42 N.E.2d 119, 121 (1942). 
100. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); see supra note 63 and accompanying 
text. 
101. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); see supra note 72. 
102. See Note, supra note 23, at 883. 
103. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the rational 
connection test, see Osenbaugh, supra note 43, at 471-74. 
104. Both concepts require a defendant to come forward and produce evidence on an 
issue. See Osenbaugh, supra note 43, at 472; Note, supra note 23, at 884. 
105. See supra note 43. 
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to affirmative defenses. Originating in Morrison v. California, 106 the 
key to this test is whether there exists "a manifest disparity in conven-
ience of proof and opportunity for knowledge" to justify relieving the 
state from having to produce evidence on an issue until it has been 
fairly raised by the defendant. 107 According to the Morrison Court, a 
"manifest disparity" exists "where a general prohibition is applicable to 
every one who is unable to bring himself within the range of an excep-
tion."108 This is precisely analogous to the presumption created under 
the blue sky provisions that generally prohibit all sales of securities un-
less a person can show that he falls outside the prohibition and is there-
fore exempt from prosecution. 
The creation of the presumption thus has a valid basis, and a de-
fendant in a prosecution for selling unregistered securities can constitu-
tionally be required to offer some proof of his claimed exemption from 
the provisions of the Uniform Act. Although this disposes of any ob-
jections to the minority view on shifting the burden of proving exemp-
tions,l09 further analysis is necessary. The comparative convenience 
test justifies placing the burden of producing some evidence on the ex-
emption issue, but it is not considered a sufficient ground for requiring 
a defendant to bear the entire burden of proof, including the risk of 
nonpersuasion. 110 Because most courts have interpreted statutes like 
section 402(d) to require a defendant in a blue sky prosecution to bear 
the entire burden of proving exemption, III it remains to be seen 
whether this practice is permissible within the limits of due process. 
3. The Constitutionality of Placing the Burden of Persuasion on the 
Defendant 
There are several arguments against placing the burden of persua-
sion on the defendant. Prior to discussing these arguments, however, 
the following will survey the arguments in favor of such a shift. 
A common justification for requiring a defendant to bear the en-
tire burden of proof is what has been termed the "greater includes the 
lesser" rationale. 112 It is believed that the Supreme Court, at least par-
tially, relied upon this justification in Patterson v. New York. 113 This 
theory provides that if the legislature may criminalize certain conduct 
without providing for a particular defense, then allowing such a de-
106. 291 U.S. 82 (1934). 
107. fd. at 91. 
108. fd. 
109. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
110. See Osenbaugh, supra note 43, at 437,451 n.120; Note, supra note 23, at 882. 
Ill. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. 
1I2. For a discussion of this theory, see Note, After Patterson, supra note 72, at 667. 
Defenses arising under this theory have been referred to as "fair compromise" 
defenses. See Osenbaugh, supra note 43, at 459-67. 
lB. 432 U.S. 197 (1977); see Dutile, supra note 68, at 382; Note, After Patterson, supra 
note 72, at 667. 
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fense is a gratuitous gesture on its part that justifies requiring a defend-
ant to bear the entire burden of proving the defense. The corollary to 
this is that if a defense is constitutionally mandated, i.e., an element of 
the offense, then the defendant cannot be required to bear the burden 
of persuasion. 114 As applied in a blue sky registration context, since all 
sales of unregistered securities may be punished, permitting certain 
transactions involving a particular number or type of securities to be 
made on an exempt basis is arguably a bonus to the defendant that 
justifies requiring him to prove that his transaction falls within the ex-
empted class. Although at first glance this reasoning seems appealing, 
a closer analysis suggests otherwise. 
This rationale arguably tends to legitimize all affirmative defenses 
because of the difficulty in determining the elements of an offense. I IS 
In the present analysis it has been suggested that the necessity of regis-
tration prior to offering for sale is an element of the offense of selling 
unregistered securities. 116 It has further been suggested that the state 
has already been permitted to ease its burden in the prosecution of 
these cases by presuming the necessity of registration and requiring the 
defendant to offer some evidence to the contrary before it must discuss 
the exemption issue. I 17 To shift upon the defendant the burden of per-
suasion as to this presumed element would relieve the state of its bur-
den, something disallowed even under Patterson. 118 
Other asserted justifications for shifting the burden of persuasion 
to a defendant include the difficulty the state would have in proving a 
negative, i.e., that the transaction or the securities offered are not ex-
empt, and that the facts required to prove the issue are peculiarly 
within the defendant's knowledge. It is fairly well settled that neither 
constitutes a sufficient ground for relieving the state of its burden. I 19 
The arguments against shifting the burden of persuasion stem pri-
marily from an emphasis on the important interests recognized by the 
Supreme Court in Winship and Mullaney. 120 If one accepts the view 
that Patterson was a decision based on federalism l21 then the previ-
ously recognized societal interests in reducing the risk of erroneous 
convictions and maintaining public confidence in the criminal justice 
system, as well as the defendant's interests in avoiding the stigma of a 
conviction and maintaining liberty,122 still must be considered para-
114. Note, After Patterson, supra note 72, at 667 -6S. The corollary is actually an incor-
poration of Winship and Pallerson, which held that the state must prove all of the 
elements of the offense. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
115. Note, After Patterson, supra note 72, at 66S. 
116. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. 
117. See supra notes 103-0S and accompanying text. 
liS. For the test derived from Paller son, see supra note 75. 
119. See supra notes 65 and 110 and accompanying text. 
120. See supra notes 52-54 and 64 and accompanying text. 
121. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
122. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. 
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mount. Indeed, all of the asserted justifications for shifting the entire 
burden of proof have been ruled insufficient to override these 
interests. 123 
One commentator has reasoned that the burden of persuasion 
should be on the prosecution because of the defendant's "fundamental 
right" to liberty, i.e., the right to be free from imprisonment. 124 By 
characterizing the defendant's right in this fashion, the state is required 
to show compelling reasons for infringing upon the right, and must 
prove "all issues relevant to guilt."125 At least one other commentator 
has similarly placed this broad burden of persuasion on the state. 126 
The growing view today is that "the burden of persuasion [should] 
be shifted to the defendant only in the most exceptional circum-
stances."127 Advocates of this view reason that any difficulties the state 
may encounter in proving an issue, because of a disparity in the abili-
ties of the state and the defendant to gain access to certain facts, can be 
remedied by shifting only the burden of production. 128 It is further 
contended, quite persuasively, that shifting only this lesser burden pro-
tects the interests of both the state and the defendant since it relieves 
the defendant of the risk of nonpersuasion, and eases the state's burden 
in not having to disprove every possible affirmative defense until the 
defense is put in issue. 129 Accomodating the different interests in this 
fashion has no effect on trial procedure "since the facts necessary to 
disprove these defenses [such as exemptions] usually are the same facts 
introduced as evidence of the crime."130 
Thus, it seems clear that the minority interpretation of section 
402(d), as stated in People v. Dempster, 131 withstands constitutional 
challenge. The majority view, however, does not fare as well under this 
analysis. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The history of section 402(d) of the Uniform Act indicates that its 
purpose was to codify decisional law. All of the early decisions held 
that it was proper to require a defendant to prove exemption from blue 
sky registration provisions, and none of the courts questioned the con-
stitutionality of this requirement. By adopting the Uniform Act, state 
legislatures impliedly approved these decisions, and as later courts de-
123. See supra notes 65 and 110 and accompanying text. 
124. Osenbaugh, supra note 43, at 474-77. 
125. Id 
126. Note, After Patterson, supra note 72, at 678. 
127. Id; accord Osenbaugh, supra note 43, at 479; Note, supra note 23, at 893. 
128. See, e.g., Osenbaugh, supra note 43, at 451; Note, supra note 23, at 887-88. 
129. Note, supra note 23, at 893. 
130. Id at 888. In proving an unlawful sale of securities the state would logically and 
necessarily introduce evidence of the types and number of securities issued and 
would therefore contradict most if not all of the possible exemptions. 
131. 396 Mich. 700, 242 N.W.2d 381 (1976). 
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termined whether section 402( d) was constitutional, most simply de-
ferred to legislative judgment. 
The early view that placed upon the defendant the entire burden 
of proving blue sky exemption is still prevalent today, as most courts 
give statut~ _1.ik_e section 402( d) a literal interpretation. Some of the 
more recent decisions have recognized a possible due process problem 
with interpreting the statute in this manner, but none has fully ana-
lyzed the constitutionality of shifting the entire burden of proving ex-
emptions. By applying recent Supreme Court decisions that outline the 
due process requirements in the area of shifting burdens of proof and 
persuasion, and focusing on the important interests at stake in a crimi-
nal prosecution, there exists valid reason for questioning state court 
holdings that interpret section 402( d) as shifting the entire burden of 
proving exemptions onto the defendant in criminal prosecutions. 
Although most courts that have analyzed the issue of blue sky ex-
emption have placed the entire burden of proof on a defendant, a few 
courts have interpreted statutes similar to section 402(d) as requiring 
only that a defendant raise the issue of an exemption by offering some 
proof, thus leaving to the state the ultimate burden of proving that 
none is present. Analysis reveals that this limited shift in the burden of 
proof is not only constitutional, but satisfies the interests of both the 
state and the defendant. 
The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement132 arguably 
leaves state legislative decisions regarding the burdens of proof and de-
fining criminal offenses to the scrutiny of state courts. Until these 
courts either adopt the minority interpretation of section 402( d) or pro-
vide some reasoned analysis to support the statutory allocation of the 
entire burden of proving blue sky exemptions, the constitutionality of 
section 402( d), as literally interpreted, remains in doubt. 
Anthony J. DiPaula 
132. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
